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ABSTRACT
Legislators, recognizing the need to increase the
national savings rate, have introduced profit-sharing and
thrift savings plans to civilians, but have not included the
military. This thesis examines the need for and the costs
and benefits of an employer-sponsored savings plan for
active duty military personnel. It concludes that it is
both feasible and cost-effective to tailor tax-sheltered
annuities (TSAs) currently available to nonprofit organiza-
tions to the military compensation system. It proposes an
account for saving active pay (ASAP) that would permit con-
tributions of one percent of base pay (up to the 20 percent
which TSAs allow) per year of military service with the
account maturing upon termination of active duty. This pro-
gram, as envisioned for active duty military personnel,
would provide an incentive to improve personal financial
management practices. This, in turn, would encourage
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I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. savings rate has been declining for the past
three decades and is among the lowest of all the
industrialized nations. One of the effects of our low
savings rate is a higher cost of capital for U.S. firms.
This in turn discourages investment, reduces productivity
and limits economic growth of the country. An additional
anomaly of attracting foreign capital to meet the savings
shortfall leads to a balance of trade deficit. It also
results in the loss of domestic capital necessary to pay the
ensuing interest.
This thesis introduces the evidence of the declining
national savings rate, reviews the sectors of national
savings (i.e., government, corporate and household), and
discusses a number of adverse implications. The decline in
net savings is attributed to dissaving by the federal
government with persistent budget deficits as well as a
decline in the household (or personal) savings sector.
Research indicates that the decline in the savings rate and
its implications are significant and that governmental
action is needed to reverse this condition. Corrective
action, however, must not transfer resources from one sector
to another, but must raise the overall net rate.
Part of the reason for low personal savings in the
United States is that the government discriminates against
1
saving. It indirectly favors consumption by double taxa-
tiorn, first by taxing the initial income and second by
taxing the interest earned from the savings. Our present
taxing system, the income tax approach, could be changed
gradually toward an expenditure (or consumption) tax system
to neutralize this tax bias. Under the expenditure tax
approach, households can choose savings options for their
income that will not be immediately taxed. This system
taxes only the income that is spent on consumption. This
eliminates the bias towazds an immediate consumptiin by
reducing the disincentive to save. It is important to n3te
that in a number of ways we rave been gradually moving
toward this system. Several options such as pension plans,
investment in home ownership and certain life insurance
policies allow income to be tax-deferred. Building tax
shelters for income into our present tax system eliminates
the double taxation and builds the personal savings rate.
Recognizing the need for increased savings, legislators
have introduced profit-sharing and thrift savings plans for
civilians but have not included the military. These
programs are effective because contributions to these
accounts are automatically withdrawn from the salary before
taxes, and the earnings are tax deferred as well. Individ-
ual retirement accounts (IRAs) also provide a supplemental
retirement benefit which increases long term savings and
provioes additional capital for economic growth. IRAs offer
2
an incentive to defer up to $2000 per year of taxable income
but have not a-hieved widespread participation.
IRAs do not offer the flexibility of employer-sponsored
plans with respect to borrowing against assets. Employer-
sponsored 1 r such as the 401(K), profit-sharing and
thrift savings plans offer sweetened benefitZ that are more
appealing than IRAs. These plans, specifically designed to
meet the needs of their employees, are extremely popular.
They enhance retirement benefits and thus serve to
increase retention.
An example of this type of plan is the 403(b) or tax-
sheltered annuity (TSA). This plan is available to
nonprofit organizations and public school employees. Its
benefits inciude a contribution limit of up to 20 percent
of salary or $9,500 annually. Additionally, contributors
can choose to invest in mutual funds or government-backed
securities. In the latter case, funds can be borrowed
against at low rates. This provides the flexibility of
meeting intermediate savings goals such as educational
expenses with a long-term savings account.
Thic research explains the benefits of extending this
program's eligibility to active duty military personziel
while tailoring the contribution requirements to the mili-
tary compensation system. The military compensation system
rewards both longevity and rank. The case is made for
allowing incremental increaszs in the eligibility of service
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members to contribute to a tax-sheltered savings plan as
part of a broad effort to increase national savings.
Nonprofit organizations provide an extrL retirement
incentive to their employees which allows them to compete
more effectively with the private sector. The all-
volunteer military force may also be considered a nonprofit
organization. Nonprofit organizations provide social
benefits to the public without profit. The military
provides the general public with the social benefit of
common defense.
The need for a similar employer-sponsored saving program
for active duty personnel is based principally on the equity
issue. Civilians have the option of using employer-
sponsored savings plans, while members of the military do
not. Yet active duty military personnel have special needs
and attributes. These factors include the military's
relatively young age-group, its high frequency of directed
moves and the existence of a military/civilian pay gap.
Military pay scales have to be competitive with the private
sector. Extending a TSA type of program to the military
would offer an additional retirement benefit. This would
help offset the approximate 10 percent pay gap between the
military and its civilian counterparts.
Further evidence is reviewed that may ultimately be of
benefit to the government as well. These include increasing
retention and targeting benefits to those who elect to
4
participate (career active duty personnel). This savings
program would not affect retirement outlays for retirees.
The proposed savings program would be called an Account
for Saving Ac'ive Pay, or ASAP. The 1990 pay schedule was
used to calculate the maximum account balance that could be
achieved for Officers and Enlisted personnel using ASAP.
The thrift savings plan, offered to government
civilian employees, was used to approximate participation
levels for the ASAP program. The ensuing costs to the
government for implementing the program, resulting from the
deferred tax, were estimated and compared with the benefits.
This thesis concludes that it is both feasible and
ultimately cost-effective to extend TSA eligibility to
active duty military personnel. The proposed ASAP program
would be most successful by phasing in benefits and
maintaining the heirarchical principle of the military
compensation system. Specifically, it would permit
ontributions of 1 percent of base pay, up to the 20 percent
that TSAs allow, per year of military service. The program
as envisioned would dovetail into existing initiatives to
improve personal financial management practices. This
woiild, in turn, help improve the national savings rate.
5
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II. THE NATIONAL SAVINGS PROBLEM
In a statement on September 19, 1989, before the Com-
mittee on the Budget in the House of Representatives, the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office, Robert D.
Reischauer, said:
The American rate of saving is low both by historical
and international standards. Since 1980, net national
saving has averaged only 3.4 percent of net national
product (gross national product less capital
depreciation) compared with 8.2 percent in the
1950-1979 period.
Americans also save far less than residents of other
industrialized countries. During the 1980s, the
United States saving rate has been only 60 percent
of the average for members of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[Ref. 1]
Figure 2.1 illustrates the low U.S. net national saving as
compared with the other 19 OECD countries.
A November 8, 1989 report from the Congressional Re-
search Service (CRS), entitled "The Low Saving Rate:
Perspectives and Policy Options," highlights the historical
phenomenon in Table 2.1. The CRS report specifically warns:
The massive deterioration in the net national saving
rate should not go unnoticed. For three decades,
1950 through 1979, the net national saving rate
averaged a surprisingly near constant 7.5 percent
of GNP. During the decade of the 1980s this ratio
fell by more than half to 3.1 percent. This serious
erosion of the net national saving rate could have
profound implications for the growth of the capital
stock and the long run rise in productivity.
[Ref. 2]
Some economists (e.g., Hendershott and Peek) have tripd to
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FIGURE 2.1 Net National Saving, 1980-1986
Source: Congressional Budget Office calculations based on
data from the Organization for Economic Cooperat-
tion and Development.[Ref. l:p. 2)
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TABLE 2.1. NATIONAL SAVING BY SECTOR
(as a percent of GNP)
Net
Net of De- Total Public&
Years Personal Business preciation Gov't Private
1950-59 4.7 11.5 7.6 -0.1 7.5
1960-69 4.6 12.0 8.1 -0.3 7.8
1970-79 5.6 12.0 8.1 -0.9 7.3
1980-88 3.8 12.9 5.6 -2.6 3.1
1984 4.4 13.5 6.8 -2.8 4.1
1985 3.1 13.4 5.7 -3.3 2.4
1986 3.0 12.9 4.9 -3.4 1.5
1987 2.3 12.4 3.7 -2.5 1.2
1988 3.0 12.2 4.6 -2.0 2.6
1989:1st half3.9 11.5 5.0 -2.0 3.0
The last column is equal to the sum of private sector saving
net depreciation and total public sector saving.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.[Ref. 2 :p. 13]
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such as military hardware, education outlays and research
and development to U.S. saving in attempts to make U.S.
savings compare more favorably with other developed
countries. Although "recategorizing" can appear to close a
savings cap with high saving countries, it does not change
the substantial drop observed in the U.S. saving trend
during the 1980's. The fact that these trends signal a
significant drop in net national saving is widely recognized
by economists. The debate among economists concerning the
U.S. saving rate ranges from conservative economists to
liberals. Some well known economists feel that in order to
restore growth, the U.S. must raise its savings rate.
This camp cuts across party lines including liberals
such as Harvard economist Benjamin Friedman, author of
Day of Reckoning: "The Consequences of American
Economic Policy in the 1980's" ("Society Pays for
Eating its Seed Corn.") as well as conservatives such
as investment banker Peter G. Peterson, whose new
book On Borrowed Time attributes America's woes to
a consumption and entitlement binge [Ref. 3].
Fred Block, a University of Pennsylvania professor
challenges the basis for these arguments by calculating the
saving rate by using the "flow of funds" data from the
Federal Reserve.[Ref. 3] Reviewing the alternative methods
used by the Department of Commerce to calculate the gross
private saving statistics can help us to attain a more
informed position.
National saving reflects the actions of the three
principle sectors of the economy. Household saving
is the result of the spending decisions by
individuals and families; business saving reflects
decisions by firms to retain after-tax profits; and
10
government saving is the outcome of the political
debate over revenue measures and spending priorities.
[Ref. 4)
Economic discussion is often trained on a sector such
as the government sector with its budget deficit, but its
implied focus is the improvement of national saving or the
cumulative effect. It is important to think of all sectors
as contributing to the national saving rate in a collective
sense. Additions to one sector could lead to a correspon-
ding drop in another, resulting in no overall increase. Net
national saving is the critical quantity used because it is
the amount of resources remaining after depreciation is
accounted for. It conceptually makes sense to compare
figures after depreciation because additional investment
cannot take place unless the capital that has worn out has
been replaced. Gross national product (GNP) is the measure
of goods and services produced during a specific period of
time. National savings can be obtained by comparing it
against one of two benchmarks. They include the GNP or the
net national product (GNP corrected for depreciation). The
first results in gross national savings and the second
results in net national savings. The trends are calculated
in terms of percentages.
Calculating savings is straightforward for the cor-
porate and government sectors. However, the personal saving
rate in the household sector can be tabulated in two
different ways, the National Income and Products Accounts
(NIPA) approach and the Flow of Funds (FOF) approach.
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Personal saving, by definition, is the disposable income
that is not spent on consumption. The NIPA approach
differs from the FOF approach in tabulating the personal
saving rate in its classification of consumer consumption.
In the conventional NIPA measure, expenditures on housing
are treated as investment (savings) while expenditures on
all other durables are considered consumption. The FOF
treats all expenditures on consumer durables (e.g., autos,
major appliances and furniture) as long-term investment.
The result is a higher personal saving rate using the FOF
method. The U.S., with its propensity for buying durables,
would not display as dramatic a drcp in personal saving
using the FOF calculation method. A 1984 study entitled
Conflicting Measures of Private SavinQ suggests that "for
the early 1980's the national income measure of private
saving may be less subject to error than the alternative FOF
measure."[Ref. 2:p. 12] The point is, as long as we use
historical statistical methods consistently, a dramatic
decrease in the net saving rate is revealed.
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A. LOANABLE FUNDS
The most important implication of low savings is that
it can lead to slow growth in living standards. This can be
explained through the effect on the loanable funds market.*
Net savings from the private sector feed the loanable funds
market. However, competition for the resource pool comes
from the government sector and the corporate sector.
Figure 2.2 illustrates how the corporate sector borrows for
investment from the loanable funds market. It also shows
that when the federal government operates at a budget
deficit (expenditures exceeding revenues), the government
becomes a net borrower from the loanable funds market. This
results in competition between the government and the
corporate sector for the limited pool of saved resources.
The "crowding out"** that takes place raises the interest
rates higher than they would normally be. This crowding out
diverts saved resources away from capital formation and
thereby reduces the nation's ability to grow. The
*The loanable funds market coordinates the actions of
borrowers and lenders. This market permits households,
businesses, and governments to borrow against their assets
or against future expected income. As the circular flow of
income implies, households are generally net suppliers of
loanable funds (See Figure 2.2).[Ref. 5]
**Crowding out is spoken of in terms of competition
among borrowers in the financial markets [Ref. 6]. It
results in high interest rates generated by budget deficits
that are financed by borrowing in the private loanable
funds market [Ref. 5:p. 530].
13
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Businesses and governments often demand loanable funds
to finance capital investment projects and other expend-
itures. Financial institutions, such as savings and
loan associations, commercial banks, insurance
companies, pension funds, and the stock and bond markets
form the core of this market.[Ref. 5:p. 189]
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dynamics of the forces on the loanable funds market are
illustrated in Figure 2.2.
The other principle sources funding the pool of invest-
able resources are state and local government budget sur-
pluses and net inflows of foreign capital. These are not
shown on the basic macroeconomic market model in Figure 2.2.
However, they can be thought of as an adjustment to the
loanable funds market.
State and local government surpluses help to keep
interest rates down, although they are small in comparison
to the recent federal government's deficits
(see Figure 2.3). Thus, the government remains a net
borrower. This still leaves the government sector
preempting a significant share of net savings.
A net inflow of foreign capital can be attracted to the
loanable funds market by favorable interest rates. "The
substitution of foreign capital for U.S. saving, while
maintaining the growth of capital per worker, still
depresses the growth of living standards."[Ref. l:p. 5]
It does this when future national resources are sacrificed
in order to pay the accumulating interest and dividends to
foreign creditors.
B. BALANCE OF TRADE
Another important implication of low national saving is
the effect on national trade accounts. Low national savings
means that higher U.S. interest rates are necessary to
15







1950 1960 1970 1910 1990
FIGURE ?.3
Federal Deficits: Befor- and After Adding State
and Local Surplus, (1950-1989)
Source: Congressional Budget Office, based on data from the
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
Note: Deficits are measured on a national income and
product accounts basis, in terms of calendar yearo.
Deficits are treated as negative. surpluses as
positive.[Ref. 6]
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attract capital. If the higher interest rates cD not
attract domestic capital, the shortfall can b - nade up from
foreign capiial. But when tnis happens, it also drives up
the price of the dollar beca-isa foreigners will convert more
of their currency to acquire dollars. This results in a
disadvantage for U.S. exports, hence contributing to our
negative balance of trade. The result is the deterioration
of the balance of international transactions in goods and
services, i.e. a large trade deficit. The U.S. deficit on
goods and services transactions is "the mirror image of the
increased inflow of foreign capital" [Ref. 7].
The immediate benefit of attracting foreign capital has
been at the expense of the competitive export industries.
The past derade has seen huge U.S. trade deficits and
volatile exchange rates which create additional risks for
international industries. Protecting industries, erecting
trade barriers and imposing quotas can, in turn, be detri-
mental to international trade and lower living standards
both in the U.S and abroad.
C. SAVING AND GROWTH
The correlation between higher rates of saving and
relatively faster rates of economic growth is noteworthy.
"Tne correlation coefficient between saving and growth
rates for the seven largest countries that belong to
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) is 0.953 ."[Ref. 2:p. 2) Considering
17
that the iange of possible values is between +1.C and
-1.0, this is statistically very high (95% confidence).
This does not suggest that higher saving rates caused the
higher growth, but does imply that when higher saving rates
are present, nations have a greater chance for growth.
D. SAVING AND MONETARY CONTROL
The Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, met
with a group of Republican senators to hear concerns about a
credit crunch and a stagnating economy in July of 1990. He
noted that:
- if [he] eased credit now, that might boost the
economy for the next six months or so but would
ultimately result in more inflation and force the
Fed to crack down even harder in the future...
(He also] argued that with slow growth in the labor
force, the only way to get the economy moving is
to increase the output, or productivity, of the
existing labor force. And the best way to improve
productivity, he argued, is to increase investment
by boosting national savings and cutting the budget
deficit.[Ref. 8]
The point here is that although the Fed can control
interst rates, it is constrained by the effect of "crowding
out" in the loanaole funds market. The corrective link in
the chain of events has to come prior to the Federal
Reserve's adiustment in interest rates, or risk runaway
inflation. That corrective link must be lower government
sector borrowing requirements, an increase in private sector
savings, or both. "In 1987, public borrowing [in the U.S.]
took 55% of net private savings; in Western Europe the
average was 20%, and in Japan it was only 1 %."[Ref. 9]
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This leads us to believe that government initiated
crowding out is much greater in the U.S. markets than
abroad. This crowding out drives up real interest rates.
Intuitively, one would expect these rising real interest
rates would attract more potential domestic investors to
supply the loanable funds market with more savings. But,
this did not happen in the 1980s. Loosening monetary policy
can help the economy expand, but more domestic savings still
needs to be generated or public borrowing abated to avoid
inflation.
E. CONSUMPTION HABITS
Examining consumption habits in the 1980s can help ex-
plain part of the low saving rates generated by the
household sector. During the period 1979-1982, the U.S.
inflation rate was 11 percent. Since 1982, inflation has
subsided to rates below five percent.[Ref. 10] The threat
of high inflation encourages consumers to buy durable goods
immediately, rather than waiting. Therefore, if consumers
expected higher inflation they may have consumed more and
consequently saved less.
Additionally, consumers may have been more inclined to
borrow than to save for purchases. The tax structure
biased consumer decision-making toward debt financing
because interest payments were fully deductible. In addi-
tion the rule of using "other peoples' money" for leverage
during inflationary periods created healthy capital gains
19
and made debt financing more desirable than equity financ-
ing. Peter Lynch, former manager of the best performing
mutual fund (Magellan), recommends buying a house as your
first investment. He explains:
Because of leverage, if you buy a $100,000 house for
20% down and the value increases by 5% a year, you
are making a 25% return on your down payment, and the
interest on the loan is tax-deductible.[Ref. 11]
Imagine the net worth built during the high inflation years.
Most homeowners did quite well for themselves, and it is
conceivable that many thought the family house was doing all
the saving for them. More disposable income could then be
consumed and debt financed with deductible interest.
Inflation hedges were "king" from the late 1970s to the
late 1980s. Inefficient tax-shelter schemes designed to
lose tax-deductible money for years then suddenly pay off
with an appreciated asset sale, flourished.
Was this irrational consumption? Not at all.
Commercial property prices rose approximately 60% more
than inflation in the last decade [Ref. 12]. Perhaps
the inflation hedges also carried some hopes for high infla-
tion with them in the 1980s. The problem occurs when net
worth drops and a full package of debt is left behind. Many
farmers borrowed heavily and many bank failures in the farm
states resulted.[Ref. 12:p. 32] The GNP fixed-weight price
index, the broadest economy-wide measure of inflation, rose
4.1 percent in 1989, well below its 9.8-percent rate in 1980
and down from 4.5 percent in 1988 [Ref. 4:p. 177]. The drop
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in inflation should have caused a rebound in private sector
saving, but the consumption habit seems to be hard to
change.
F. THE COST OF CAPITAL
The detrimental effect of the high cost of capital on
competitiveness is especially hard to ignore. Business Week
cited a study showing that:
U.S. companies mnst pay five times what their
Japanese rivals pay to raise capital. The cause: an
anemic n7tlonal savings rate. The effect: an
American company can afford to invest in a product or
technology only if it is expected to be profitable in
tnree years. But a Japanese competitor can wait an
astonishing twelve years to break even.[Ref. 13]
Aided by the staying power advantage that comes with the
lower cost of capital, it is easy to understand how the
sound business strategy of patient investing and increasing
market share has been refined by our competitors. U.S.
financial executives, in order to compete, are forced to cut
costs to keep the bottom line up. Research and development,
with its uncertain five to seven year payoff, may be among
the first costs to be trimmed.
The low cost of capital abroad makes our competitors
the risk-takers and leads to criticism of U.S. managers and
investors as being short-sighted.
Even big high-tech companies, such as Digital
Equipment Corp., are feeling pressure to soft pedal
expensive long range projects with uncertain futures.
Digital spent $1.3 billion, or 11% of sales on R&D in
1988. But management would prefer to spend even
more--especially on long-term R&D projects. I'm
happy if the payoff doesn't come for five to ten
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years, says Samuel H. Fuller, Digital's
vice-president for research. But the markets, he
complains, tend to force everything into a six to
twelve month time frame.[Ref. 13:p. 157]
Are these examples of short-sighted management or are they
competing as well as can be expected under these conditions?
The answer is clear when we consider they are trained
executives who use proven financial analysis to achieve the
highest return on assets (ROA) possible. However, they
can be squeezed out of profitable markets and can lose
potentially productive research in the long run. Craig J.
Fuller, managing director of Chancellor Capital Management,
says:
Japan Inc. and Southeast Asia Inc. have a low cost of
capital and a willingness to bet on the future, while
the American public market is focused on the next
quarter's earnings.[Ref. 13:p. 157]
Companies forced to fund long-term competitive R&D projects
with interest rates compounding against them cannot justify
the investments. This situation has produced the impetus
for consortia (e.g., Sematech), global mergers, and the
relaxing of antitrust regulations. The question is are
they solutions or temporary adjustments?
G. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LOW SAVINGS ON BUSINESS EXPANSION
Companies would enter into competitive long-term
projects if the marginal cost of capital justified it. An
increased supply of loanable funds through higher savings
would lower interest rates enough to encourage risk taking.
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The problem is encouraging long-term business expansion. In
an article entitled "Savings, Capital Formation, and
National Security" for the SAIS Review, it is argued that
the root of the problem is the low savings rate in conjunc-
tion with the large budget deficit:
The consistently higher returns obtained by U.S.
companies [referencing their profitability surveys
cited from Fortune) support the hypothesis that the
decline in U.S. competitiveness is primarily caused by
inadequate capital spending.[Ref. 14]
The authors illustrate the effect of inadequate capital
formation with a hypothetical example:
Suppose that in 1983 scientists and engineers of two
companies, one American and one Japanese, had each
developed similar devices that would be useful in the
field of telecommunications. Both companies
calculated that these devices, after investment of
$220 million, would achieve in seven years sales of
$100 million per year and would yield a return of 12
percent per year on investment. The Japanese company
would have entered this business; in Japan, with its
high savings rate, 12 percent was an acceptable
projected return on an investment of this type. But
in the United States, with its much lower savings
rate, interest rates were higher and the projected
return for an investment with the level of risk of
such a project had to exceed 20 percent at that time.
[Ref. 14:p. 118]
This scenario demonstrates how other economies can have
greater expansion than we, because of our inadequate savings
rate.
The basic problem is not myopic management but the
low savings rate, which results in the expectation of
a higher return on investment in the United States
than in the other free-world nations.[Ref. 14:p. 119]
The main point needs to be underscored. Economic growth
in the corporate sector depends on the ability of firms to
make cost-effective expansion decisions. However, expensive
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capital can make innovative and potentially productive pro-
jects seem too risky to try. This tendency to concentrate
on proven rate of return projects results in criticism for
managers and investors as being short-sighted. The criti-
cism is misplaced. Managers and investors are making
rational decisions under the existing conditions. It is
these economic conditions, beyond their control that need to
be changed in order to spur long-term economic growth.
H. DEMOGRAPHICS
Proposed solutions to the saving problem must consider
demographic shifts and global savings requirements. Future
saving rates will be affected by the spike in the population
caused by the "baby boom" generation, which includes those
born between 1946 and 1964.
A life-cycle model of savings distinguishes three
different propensities to save during a lifetime: 20-45,
where relatively low savings takes place; 45-64, which is
th strongest period, building for retirement while earning
the highest income; and, over 64, where general dissavings
takes place. Coupling this information with the baby boom
era we observe this generation was in its lowest saving
years during the entire 1980s.
The implication is that in the early years of the
twenty-first century this group will be in their peak
earning and saving years. The second boomlet peak year
babies will turn 45 in the year 2002. Some economists have
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theorized that a wave of personal savings will be generated
by the baby boomers who, when in their 40's, will start
saving for retirement and their childrens' tuitions.*
Other economists are not as convinced, citing evidence
that "baby boomers" have thus far spent more at every age.
These economists have introduced additional mitigating
factors that suggest an automatic surge in personal savings
may not be the case. Some have attempted to quantify
the order of magnitude that the baby-boom generation
building of savings is most likely to provide.
Based on population trends and age-related income and
saving profiles, McKelvey and Benderly [economists at
Goldman, Sachs & Co.] calculate that the aging of the
baby-boom generation will augment the personal saving
rate by less than a percentage point between now and the
turn of the century. Economists at Data Resources (DRI)
think it could be even less--on the order of three-
tenths of a percentage point.[Ref. 15]
That high-earning, high saving group between 45 and
64 has been shrinking as a proportion of the
population since 1970. During the 1990's, its share
will rise from 29 percent to 35 percent though the
salutory effect on saving may be blunted by the
growth of the nonsaving, over-65 population.[Ref. 16]
In a review entitled "Will The Baby Boomers Bail Out
America?," the authors of Rust to Riches are criticized for
being too passive and for overrating the demographics.
[They] seem content to rely on demographic shifts to
right all the wrongs of the past two decades. That
line of thinking is much too passive. What we really
need is action and soon.[Ref. 17]
*Rust to Riches: The CominQ of the Second Industrial
Revolution. Allen, Deborah and Rutledge, John. New York:
Harper and Row, 1989.
25
This clearly argues for the government to target the savings
problem now with incentives to encourage savings and deficit
reduction.
The consensus is that the demographics are an important
consideration for putting upward pressure on savings rates,
but may only account for modest rises. But incentives that
can affect spending and saving habits across the demographic
chart may ultimately prove more important if we are to see a
return to previous levels of domestic saving befcre early in
the next century.
I. GLOBAL DEMAND FOR SAVINGS
When we view the world from the closed-economy per-
spective, it is capable of transferring savings among
countries, but not capable of investing more than it saves.
Therefore, it is critical for countries involved in
leadership positions to generate greater savings--
investable resources--to meet huge future demands. The
world resource pool of savings will most likely be
strained to meet the ever-increasing demand involving the
reconstruction in Eastern Europe and the development
requirements of Latin and South America, Africa and the
poor countries in Asia. Global investment opportunities
are most likely to be considerable, perhaps even
including China.
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If savings are adequate to hold interest rates down,
expansion will be more rapid than otherwise possible.
Although we cannot control the future requirements for
savings, we must consider them in our planning. The
implication is that a return to the normal U.S. historical
level of saving may not be high enough when faced with a
more likely greater demand for savings.
£f we agree that increased national savings is neces-
sary, the question becomes how to increase the national
savings rate. The answer is through actions that raise
individual savings components (government, corporate and
personal) by more than they lower the other sectors. In
short, we must increase the net national savings account.
The focus is clear, but the means to get there provides the
difficulty.
J. THE GOVERNMENT SECTOR
The government sector can become a net saver by
achieving a budget surplus. The existence of the Balanced
Budget Act (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) suggests that this
is a legislative priority. The government sector has been
progressively draining national savings by its failure to
balance its annual budgets. Spending expansion has been
difficult to control, especially in the area of
entitlements.
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The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) law set up targets to
eliminate annual budget deficits (See Table 2.2).
Initially, targets were set up to gradually decrease the
budget deficit to 0 by 1991. In 1987, these targets had to
be revised with the new goal of eliminating the deficit by
1993. There has been much criticism of the federal govern-
ment for its failure to meet these targets. However, since
the adoption of GRH, deficits have been "far below the path
projected prior to the adoption of GRH."[Ref. 4:p. 71]
Evidence indicates the deficit problem is still with us
and is likely to be for some time. GRH has reduced Federal
borrowing, and for that reason it has been valuable.
However, we still need more discipline and control in the
government sector in order to raise net national saving.
Charles Schultze, of the Brookings Institution, sug-
gests that "to achieve a reasonable accumulation of national
saving in the 1990s as a whole, budget policy should
probably aim for a gradual transition to an overall surplus
of about 1 percent of national income for the last half of
the 1990s."[Ref 18] Schultze argues that "the rise in the
federal budget has been a major contributor to [the] fall
in national saving. Its elimination, and indeed conversion
into a surplus, may be the only sure way to restore a
healthy level of national saving."[Ref 18:p. 26] According
to his reasoning, if the government appears powerless to
induce personal saving, it must make up the difference.
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TABLE 2.2 GRH AND BUDGET DEFICITS: THE RECORD
(Billions of dollars)
Actual
Fiscal Year 1985 1987 Actual as percent
Target Target Deficit of GNP
1986 ................... 171.9 171.9 221.2 5.3
1987 ................... 144.0 144.0 149.7 3.4
1988 ................... 108.0 244.0 155.1 3.2
1989 ................... 72.0 136.0 152.0 2.9
1990 ................... 36.0 100.0 NA NA
1991 .................... 0 64.0 NA NA
1992 ................... .0 28.0 NA NA
1993 ................... .0 .0 NA NA
Sources: Department of the Treasury and Office of
Management and Budget.[Ref. 4:p. 72]
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K. THE PERSONAL SECTOR
A high saving country like Japan does not seem
"poweiless" to induce its private sector to save (See Table
2.3.) Tt has accomplished high personal saving rates in
part by moving away from the tax bias (taxing interest
earned on savings) and by providing Japanese savers with
greater returns.
The response of household saving to changes in the
rate of return on saving is a critical issue, because
tax policy directly affects the rate of return.. .em-
pirical studies on balance suggest that saving
increases modestly with higher rates of return.
[Ref 4:p. 138]
Table 2.3 indicates the relationship among the three sectors
of saving and the total net saving rate. Of the three
sectors, households account for, by far, the largest
contribution to saving. By adjusting the tax structure,
governments can influence the relat 4 ve saving.
In an essay entitled: "Are There Lessons for the United
States in the Japanese Tax System?," the authors cite an
incentive for saving as a principle finding:
The single most important feature of the tax law that
permits [investors to keep a far higher fraction of
the return of their investments than their American
counterparts] is Japan's generous tax-sheltered savings
plans.[Ref. 19]
Each individual is allowed to have four nontaxable
accounts for different purposes (comparable to our
IRAs). These Lour accounts allow an individual to
shelter about $82,500 from taxation. It is estimated
that about 70 percent of the ownership and aebt and
equity capital uses these tax-free accumulation ve-
hicles. They dwarf the similar Individual Retirement
Accounts in the United States.[Ref. 19:p. 313])
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TABLE 2.3 NET SAVING RATES, BY SECTOR, 1980-1987
(NET SAVING AS % OF NET NATIONAL INCOME)
Total Government* Households Enterprises
Japan 20.3 4.1 13.5 2.7
Italy 12.8 na na na
W. Germany 10.8 1.4 8.9 0.5
Canada 9.9 -3.9 9.7 4.1
France 8.6 na na na
Britain 6.3 -1.6 5.0 3.4
United States 4.2 -3.9 6.2 2.0
*includes some public physical capital investment as saving.
Source: OMB [Ref. 20)
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This saving investment lesson could be adapted in the
U.S. by moving toward a consumption or expenditure tax phil-
osophy. Under our income tax system, income is taxed and if
a portion is saved (not immediately spent on consumption),
interest earned on those savings is again taxed. This
double taxation of saving represents a bias against saving.
It is important to note that the consumption tax system en-
visioned here is not a sales tax or value-added tax. It is:
A personal tax where the base is income less savings.
So-called "qualifying accounts" would be tax deduct-
ible. The funds could be invested in savings accounts,
bonds, stocks, mutual funds and a wide array of
financial instruments. The earnings on the assets of
the account would not be taxed unless they were
withdrawn and spent.[Ref. 21]
In many respects we are halfway toward a consumption
tax concept. With pension plans, investment in housing
(rollover returns can remain untaxed), and in return life
insurance programs, the tax may be deferred. The consump-
tion tax could be made as progressive as desired by
varying the rate. Other advantages include its simplicity
of cash-flow, inflation-proofing, and neutrality toward
spending.
Michael Boskin and John Shoven advocate the
implementation of a consumption tax system by:
extreme liberalization of Keogh and IRA pension
savings vehicles. If the limits on these (vehicles)
' ere raised, if the assets that could be held were
very inclusive and if the taxable withdrawal could be
made at any time, then these existing institutions
could effectively institute a consumption or
expenditure tax.[Ref. 21:p. 215]
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Our present income tax system favors consumption over
saving. Moving toward a more neutral system would almost
certainly immediately improve savings.
The Family Saving Account (FSA), a proposal put forward
by the Bush Administration, represents an example of the
commitment to promote national saving. It is "best viewed
as part of the larger program to reduce the bias against
saving in the U.S." [Ref. 4:p. 139] This thesis suggests
that another part of that larger program could be an Account
for Saving Active Pay (ASAP), a tax-sheltered plan proposed
for active duty military personnel. The details of this
plan will be described in Chapter VI.
L. THE CORPORATE SECTOR
Saving in the corporate sector has remained remarkably
stable, compared to the U.S. household and government
sectors, during the last 30 years (see Table 2.1). Compar-
ing a high saving country such as Japan with the United
States, by sector, reveals where the emphasis on saving is
generated. Table 2.3 shows that Japan's net saving by
sector is 8.0 percent higher than the U.S. in the government
sector, 7.3 percent higher than the U.S. in the household
sector, and only .7 percent higher than the U.S. in the cor-
porate sector. This order of magnitude suggests that if a
meaningful change in national saving is to be a priority,




Our low national savings adversely affects our economic
grcwth. Peqe~rch indicates that the deciine in the savings
rate and its implications for the economy are real and
significant and that the government needs to reverse this
condition. It suggests the need to establish incentives,
through a carefully designed tax structure, to promote
savings that will provide us with the catalyst for
competitiveness which we need. We are moving somewhat
haphazardly toward adopting incentives to promote national
savings. Many improvements are possible and some are
presently being pursued.
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III. SAVINGS AND THE MILITARY
The low national savings rate affects all citizens,
but it is particularly costly to the military. Annual pay
increases for the all volunteer force military are publicly
debated each year with the objective of maintaining their
competitiveness with civilian employment. However, the
low saving rate of the government sector makes achieving
this objective difficult. Congress is faced with a per-
sistent and worsening deficit problem. One aspect of the
deficit problem is uncontrollable spending, that is, funding
for entitlement programs and interest on the debt.
Members of Congress realize that the low national
saving rate is a problem, but they are constrained by the
difficulty involved in cutting mandatory program growth.
Interest must be paid and reducing entitlement programs is
difficult. These programs are broadly supported by voters
and changes must be made by legislation. This is in
contrast with discretionary spending programs like defense,
which must receive annual authorization and appropriations.
Legislators are forced to concentrate on the control-
lable items like national defense. In particular, military
pay raises are annually debated and reduced relative to
inflation. The pressure created by the low saving rate is
ultimately felt by military members. Each raise that is
less than the rate of inflation yields less disposable
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income. With less disposable income, military personnel
will have to reduce their savings in order to maintain the
same standard of living.
The Director of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), Richard Darman, in his introduction of the budget for
fiscal year 1991, points out the growth in entitlements is
one of the potential liabilities in the budget. He refers
to them as "hidden pacmen" because they consume a larger
portion of the budget each year. He indicates that:
these mandatory programs plus net interest expendi-
tures account for almost 62 percent of the budget.
Since these programs generally have broad based and
well-represented beneficiary populations, they tend
to have a powerful claim on resources and grow faster
than the economy as a whole."[Ref. 22]
As these mandatory programs grow and account for a greater
share of the budget, Congress must look for places where it
can close the pursestrings. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) annually suggests a series of reductions that could be
made, including limiting military pay raises. In February
1989, the CBO suggested how the trend of eroding military
salaries began:
During the 1980s, the formal mechanism for determining
the annual military pay raise has largely been
abandoned in favor of a series of proposals by the
Administration and compromises in the Congress. The
result has generally been an increase that is smaller
than the average rise in private-sector pay.[Ref.23]
Congress rationalizes this trend by noting that
retention and recruitment appear satisfactory. But a
continuation of the trend of eroding service member
compensation will have some delayed detrimental effects.
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Replacing career military personnel is more difficult than
it is in the civilian sector. Some jobs in the service can
be contracted out to the civilian sector (e.g., aircraft
mechanics), but not when the active forces are needed for
armed conflict.
The delayed effect of decreased retention due to cuts in
compensation makes force management more difficult. Some
critics consider this to be an inefficiency in the current
retirement system. It results, in part, from the
tendency of new recruits to underestimate the value of the
retirement system as a significant portion of their total
compensation benefits. The retirement system
has little influence on prospective recruits or person-
nel in their first enlistment. This results from the
assumption that young people have a strong preference
for current rather than Jeferred income.
It provides a strong incentive for personnel in their
12th through 19th years of service to remain on active
duty... in part because of the preference for deferred
income by older people, but more importantly, because
those who leave before completing 20 years of service
receive nothing.[Ref. 24]
This may argue for including some vesting in the retirement
system, but it also points out that the full effects from
recent cuts in retirement benefits and smaller pay increases
have not as yet completely manifested themselves. Other
than decreased retention, this manifestation can take the
form of decreases in morale, productivity and personal
financial management.
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The CBO, for its part, has indicated that although
limiting pay raises can provide significant annual savings,
there are substantial risks. They warn that
Projections of the effects of withholding military
pay raises below those in the private sector are sub-
ject to some uncertainty. Manpower analysts do not
completely understand why recruiting and retention
have remained strong in recent years despite falling
relative pay and an improving economy: today's service
members may be less sensitive to these pressures than
their predecessors; or the full effects of these changes
still may not have been felt.[Ref. 23:p. 82)
The Government Accounting Office (GAO) provides evidence
that this lowering of military pay raises is comprehensive
throughout the military. They state:
Military pay raise percentages have been lower in recent
years than private-sector pay raise percentages.
Recent comparison of selected military and civilian
jobs shows that in 94 percent of them, military pay
was less than the pay in the private sector.
[Ref. 24:p. 43]
Inflation has been rising at a rate of 5 percent per
year, since 1982, and rose 4.1 percent in 1989.
[Ref. 4 :p. 177) The military needs annual pay raises of
equal amounts just to maintain equilibrium. An absolute
rise of anything less, in effect, is a reduction in buying
power for military personnel. This has been the trend. The
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report--Fiscal
Year 1990 states the situation:
The military must be able to offer fair compensation
that is competitive with civilian employment wages.
Continuation of pay caps will seriously damage our
ability to attract and retain quality manpower. Pay
caps from FY lq83-1988 resulted in a disparity between
military pay and private sector wage growth of eleven
percent, as measured by the Employment Cost Index. In
FY 89, a 4.3 percent pay raise for the military members
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became one of the highest priorities of the Department
of Defense. The Congress supported the Department of
Defense with a 4.1 percent increase and ended a con-
secutive six year trend in which the military pay raise
was less than the civilian wage growth. This narrowed
the gap to 10.1 percent. The disparity between military
and private sector wages must continue to decrease.
[Ref. 25]
The consequences of this pay gap may not be immediately
felt, but they will over a period of time. Without pay
comparability, retention will suffer, especially for the
career personnel who cannot immediately be replaced.
The current compensation disparity between the military
and the civilian sector does not show any sign of
decreasing.
The military's 4.1 percent raise cleared a final hurdle
October 19 when the Pentagon and Bush administration
agreed to allow the 1991 defense authorization bill to
provide service members the same size raise as approved
for federal civilian employees.
[Senator John Glenn, D-Ohio, chairman of the Senate
armed service committee on manpower and personnel],
pointed out that the 4.1 percent raise is still less
than the 5.4 inflation rate for the year and the 6.1
percent average rise in private sector salaries. 'But
this is the best we would do. It does not improve the
purchasing power of the service members but it prevents
it from getting worse,' he said.
Rep. Herbert Bateman, R-Va., said the 4.1 percent raise
'is not adequate.. .but I believe this is the most we
could get at this time of tight budgets.'[Ref. 26]
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A. CHANGES IN THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM
Another effect that the low national savings rate has
on active duty military personnel is the dramatic changes in
the retirement system. Congress has acted twice within six
years to limit retirement benefits by adjusting the
retirement pay formula. The latter change is considered
"the most drastic erosion of retirement benefits [to] affect
service members who enter active duty on or after August 1,
1986."[Ref. 27] The following changes were made as a result
of the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986:
* Retired pay formula changed from 2.5 times the
creditable years of service up to a maximum of 75% of
base pay to 2.5 times the years of creditable service
minus one percentage point less than 30. Reduction
to be eliminated at age 62 [Ref. 28:p. 30].
Table 3.1 below illustrates the cumulative difference:
TABLE 3.1 RETIRED PAY MULTIPLIER
YEARS OF MULTIPLIER












Source: [Ref. 28:p. 31]
* The cost of living adjustment mechanism is changed to
provide CPI minus 1 for life with a one time restoral
in the purchasing power of the annuity at age 62
[Ref. 28:p. 30].
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The changes mandated by the Retirement Reform Act will
save the government (and cost retirees) almost $3
billion on an annual accrual basis [Ref. 28:p. 30].
Even this may be understated because the trend in
cutting retirement benefits has not stopped.
Negotiators also are proposing cost-of-living limits
that would begin Dec. 1. 1991. Under the plan, in-
flation adjustments for retirees 62 or older would be
limited to 1 percentage point less than inflation
while federal retirees under the age of 62, including
retired military members, would receive no cost-of-
living increase.
The idea of denying cost-of-living adjustment to re-
tirees under the age of 62 has been proposed in the
past by both the Congressional Budget Office and the
White House's Office of Management and Budget. Pro-
ponents have argued that most retirees who are under
62 are not living solely on their federal pensions so
they have less need for their retired pay to keep
pace with inflation.[Ref. 26:p. 3]
Service members who have entered after the Reform Act
will soon be deciding whether or not to remain on active
duty. They will be comparing future military benefits with
those the private sector offers. If these individuals lose
confidence in their retirement purchasing power, retention
may dramatically decline. However, evidence indicates that
some personnel may underestimate the drop in their benefits
until their senior years. For these personnel, drops in
morale and productivity may result.
In summary, the savings problem in the U.S. at the
national level adversely affects military personnel in both
smaller pay increases and an erosion of retirement benefits.
The uncertainty of congressional support and the loss of
commitment to maintain competitiveness with the private
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sector may result in a serious loss of career military
personnel within the next several years.
The erosion of pay adversely affects the military
members' ability to adequately contribute to their own
savings accounts. There is a need to reverse this trend
as soon as possible.
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IV. EMPLOYER-SPONSORED SAVINGS PLANS
This chapter will briefly describe several existing
employer-sponsored savings plans which legislators have
approved. Employer-sponsored plans include all tax-
qualified plans such as pension, profit-sharing, 401(k), and
403(b) plans, and plans for civilian and military government
employees [Ref. 29]. These plans are intended to supplement
retirement benefits. They have also been adopted to
increase long-term savings in the household sector and
provide capital for economic growth. They are being
reviewed to serve as a basis for a discussion of a similar
program specifically tailored for the active duty military
personnel.
A. SALARY REDUCTION PLANS
Thousands of companies now offer salary reduction or
401(k) plans, including "two-thirds of the Fortune 500 firms
in 1986."[Ref. 30] The 401(k) allows contributions of up to
$7979 or 20 percent of salary which is deducted from taxable
income and grows untaxed until withdrawn.[Ref. 31] The plan
may include investing in stocks, money-market or bond funds,
or fixed income investments at the discretion of the
employer. Employees can then choose the investment vehicle
that is most suitable for them. Employers frequently match
all or a portion of the contributions.[Ref. 30]
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B. PROFIT SHARING
Over 350,000 companies in the U.S. have profit-sharing
accounts for their employees. The companies contribute
between 10 and 15 percent of their emplnyees' pay. The
annual contributions are calculated, based on the companies'
earnings. The employees are typically allowed to contribute
up to 6 percent and sometimes 10 percent of '.heir salary.
The accounts may also be invested in a variety of stock and
bond funds or guaranteed income contracts (with fixed
interest rates).[Ref. 30]
C. THRIFT SAVINGS PLANS (TSPs'
These plans are available to federal civilian employees.
The Thrift Savings Plan ('SP), although just three years
old, already has over 1.5 fillion member accounts, with
investments and earnings exceeding $5 billion .Ref. 32].
Participants who are covere by the Federal Employees'
Retirement System (FERS) may defer up to 10 percent of basic
pay and members of th9 Civil Service Retirement System
(CSRS) may defer up to 5 percent of basic pay each pay
period.[Ref. 32:p.1)
FERS employees receive an automatic I percent contribu-
tion regardless of the member's participatior. The Govern-
ment will also contribute up to an additional 4 percent to
match the contributions, if the employee maximizes this
saving opportunity. The employee may contribute up to 10
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percent of basic pay each pay period, not to exceed the IRS
limit of $7979 (the 1990 limit) [Ref. 32:p. 3].
Table 4.1 illustrates the sliding scale for automatic
and matching contributions by the government, the employer.
TABLE 4.1
PERCENT OF BASIC PAY CONTRIBUTED TO FERS ACCOUNTS
Government Puts In:
Employee Automatic Matching The Total
Puts In: Contribution Contribution Contribution
0 1 0 1
1 1 1 3
2 1 2 5
1 3 7
1 3.5 8.5
5 1 4 10
6-10 1 4 11-15
Scuie: Thrift Saving Plan pamphlet, May 1990.[Ref. 32:p. 3]
CSRS employees are allowed to contribute up to 5% of
basic pay for each pay period but dc not receive the
additional contributions from the employer. It is possible
for those who are currently in the CSRS to continue with the
4lan or to transfer to the newer FERS.
Both FERS and CSRS employees benefit from the tax
deferral of income and the earnings on the accounts. Both
are also allowed to borrow a minimum of $1000 at the
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Government Securities Investment (G) Fund rate. In 1989,
the rate was 8.81 percent. Borrowing is allowed for:
* the purchase of a primary residence;
* medical expenses;
* educational expenses; or,
* financial hardship cases.
There are three funds the plan offers for investment
opportunities:
* Government Securities Investment (G) Fund
* Common Stock Index Investment (C) Fund
* Fixed Income Index Investment (F) Fund
[Ref. 32:p. 5]
TSP offers tax deferral, flexible investment
opportunities, a loan program, withdrawal options and
portability. Having portability in a plan means being able
to roll cumulative benefits into a new plan when changing
employers. The CSRS does not have portability as a feature.
However, the newer FERS system has added portability as a
benefit. Upon termination of their employment, members have
the option to transfer their TSP money to an IRA, a new
employer's qualified retirement plan, or they may leave it
in the account and receive a deferred or immediate annuity.
[Ref. 33:p. 23]
D. THE TSA OR 403(b) PLAN
A Tax-Sheltered Annuity (TSA), or 403(b) Plan, is a
personal tax-sheltered savings plan. The plan is available
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to employees of public schools, nonprofit hospitals and
nonprofit charitable, educational, scientific or religious
groups. Payments to a TSA are automatically taken out of
the salary before the paycheck is received. Because the
contributions are deducted before pay, the income is
tax-deferred and reduces the federal tax liability.
Earnings on the account are also tax-deferred. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) permits contributions to a
TSA of up to 20 percent of the salary, or a maximum of
$9500 annually.[Ref. 34]
The Tax-Sheltered Custodial Account, a 403(b)(7), is
also an option which offers the same tax sheltering feature
of the TSA to the same special employee groups. Instead of
investing in a fixed annuity, which can be used as
collateral for loans, it is possible to invest more
aggressively (e.g., mutual funds or stock indexed
accounts). These have more of a risk, but also offer the
prospects of greater return.[Ref. 34]
All the major financial and insurance companies offer
professional management of these accounts. The important
point is that the employee can determine what is the most
appropriate personal strategy. The flexibility of changing
that strategy is also available.
Table 4.2 summarizes the relative differences among the
employer-sponsored savings plans discussed in this chapter.
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TABLE 4.2
SUMMARY OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED SAVINGS PLANS
1990 LIMITS ON EMPLOYER
PROGRAM AVAILABLE TO CONTRIBUTIONS* CONTRIBUTIONS
401(k) Private industry $7979/20% YES
Profit-
Sharing Private industry 15% YES
THRIFT Government
SAVINGS civilians $7979/10% YES
(FERS only)
TSA or Nonprofit
403(b) Organizations $9500/20% NO
Employers have taken advantage of legislation to
promote long-term savings for their employees. These plans
provide an immediate tax break by making deductions before
taxes and by sheltering the earnings. They also offer
employees a systematic and flexible savings opportunity that
is professionally managed. For some plans, the incentive is
additionally sweetened by offering varying amounts of
employer contributions. Even without the employer's
contributions, each plan still increases the employee's
saving potential.
Employer-sponsored savings plans are designed to meet
employees' needs. Employers realize that employees are
*These amounts are called "elective deferrals" because
you choose (or elect) to set aside the money, and tax on
the money is deferred until it is distributed to you.
The $7979 limit will be increased for inflation to
reflect increases in the Consumer Price Index in future
years.[Ref. 31]
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unlikely to work their entire careers for a single employer.
They also realize that their employees are not a homogenous
group. Individual employees need to assess their own
retirement requirements and have the flexibility to choose
options that are pertinent to them.
It used to be that many American workers spent almost
their entire careers working for a single employer
who would take care of them after retirement. These
days, Americans tend to change jobs more often--and
sometimes even change careers. Now, it's often left
up to workers to plan for the future if they don't
stay with one employer long enough to qualify for
retirement benefits.[Ref. 3 3 :p. 3]
Pension plans and Social Security are not intended to
replace 100% of pre-retirement income. Therefore,
encouraging a supplement to retirement income through
personal savings is essential. Employers have recognized,
by providing additional saving opportunities to employees,
that they are essentially multiplying their employees'
income. This benefits the employer by placing him in a
better position to compete for new employees and to retain
valuable, experienced employees.
This chapter has briefly described some of the major
employer-sponsored saving plans. These plans offer
essential savings opportunities and include features such as
portability and flexibility. Employee groups in both the
private and the public sectors are eligible for various
employer-sponsored saving plans. There is no comparable
plan designed for active duty military personnel. Military
personnel also need to supplement their pensions and social
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security with personal savings. The government, employer
of the all-volunteer force, also stands to benefit by
introducing a plan. The government will be better able
to compete with the private sector for experienced personnel
if a savings program for the military is established.
The remainder of this thesis will examine the military's
need for a savings program. An employer-sponsored savings
plan will then be proposed and evaluated. The purpose will
be to mesh the savings needs of the military as an employee
group with the government's need to raise the net national
savings rate.
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V. THE ACTIVE DUTY MEMBER'S
NEED FOR A SAVINGS PROGRAM
As a matter of equity, active duty military personnel
should have the same employer-sponsored savings opportu-
nities as are offered to civilians. Compounding the equity
situation is the fact that differences between service
members and civilians may aggravate the already low savings
rate characteristic of the former. These differences in-
clude a relatively young age-group, a complex compensation
system and the frequency of directed moves. As a result,
the need for a disciplined savings strategy for military
personnel is acute.
Saving rate figures are not recorded by occupation
groups, but for the country as a whole. Therefore, without
utilizing potentially misleading survey data, we can only
describe the savings behavior of military personnel by
reviewing the motivation for and determinants of household
saving.
Household saving is thought to be motivated by
a desire to finance major purchases, to provide
a reserve for uncertainties for the future and
for retirement, and to provide a bequest for one's
heirs. Given these motivations, saving depends in
addition on the size of one's income or such factors as
the availability of credit, the amount of wealth,
employer or government contributions to pension funds,




The requirement of maintaining a youthful and vigorous
force determines the composition of the military. The
majority of people who enter the military are between 18 and
22 years old. This age-group has historically had a low
propensity for saving. Even if military members choose to
stay in for a full 20 year career, they will still be in
their lower potential earning and saving years at the end of
their careers. The vast majority of military personnnel is
between 18 and 42 years, with a population concentration at
the lower end. This means the military has a significantly
younger average age than civilian companies. Since saving
is highly concentrated in the 45 to 65 year old age-group,
the military should have a relatively low savings rate.
B. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Successful financial management practices include set-
ting up a contingency savings account, prompt payment of
debt and a flexible budget. Recently, military leaders have
tried to emphasize these points, reflecting their concern
about imprudent practices. Captain Tim Myers, USN,
Commanding Officer of a large amphibious ship, expressed his
concern to his sailors and marines as follows:
* Recently there has been a steady increase of Service
Members receiving letters of indebtedness due to the
nonpayment of bills, returned checks, and most
seriously, filings for bankruptcy. The causes, in
most part, are due to Service Members' use of credit,
charge cards, mismanagement of checking accounts and
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finally, poor financial management. This poor
financial management is found in all pay grades, both
Officer and Enlisted.
We, as Service Members and ever more important,
members of society, have the responsibility to
ourselves and our dependents to liquidate our debts
in a timely manner. In order to do this, proper
management of personal finances is mandatory.
Sound management of personal finances permits prompt
bill payment, establishment of a savings fund, as
well as allowing for personal expenses.
Additionally, it will also put the Service Member
in good financial standing to receive future loans
and extensions of credit. The consequences of
improper management will result in loan refusal,
credit liability, letters of indebtedness, and quite
possibly, NJP [nonjudicial punishment] actions.
[Ref. 35]
The growing concern for the fiscal well-being of
service members is also recognized by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO), Admiral Kelso. On July 24, 1990, he
announced a forthcoming Navy Personal Financial Management,
Education, Training and Counseling Program (PFM).
During the past decade an increasing number of Navy
members experienced severe financial problems. While
several excellent programs exist to assist Service
Members with their problems, they tend to be
indepcrd ud . -ot,-Ft2rriz~3 fforts in basi.: consumer
awareness and sound money techniques.
Growing concern for the fiscal well being of Navy
members has generated a comprehensive Navy-wide Personal
Financial Management program to be implemented in fourth
quarter CY 1990. ...PFM is intended to increase
individual awareness, instill responsible attitudes
toward, and provide knowledge of actions and skills
involved in sound money management. PFM is designed to
assist Navy members and their families meet the ever
increasing challenge to quote make ends meet unquote in
today's society.[Ref. 36]
The existence of this program is not to say that severe
financial problems among military personnel are confined to
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the Navy, but that the Navy is making a comprehensive
effort to address the problem. The evidence suggests that
there is a need for military members to practice better
personal financial management. The need for a savings pro-
gram is underscored by leaders' attempts to instill better
personal financial practices in today's service members.
C. COMPLEXITY OF MILITARY INCOME
The complex compensation system in the military
"consists of more than 40 different pays and allowances and
many supplemental benefits."[Ref. 24:p. 9] All military
members receive base pay, which is taxable. While the
complexity of the system itself does not suggest a low
propensity for saving, it does mean that any incentive
program addressing the need to increase savings should be
consistent with this system and easily understandable to
personnel. It is the previously mentioned pay gap of
approximately 10 percent between the military and civilian
sectors which restricts the size of military pay and thereby
predicts a lower saving rate.
D. FREQUENT DIRECTED MOVES
The fact that members of the military have frequently
directed moves may impose the greatest disruption to
savings, and underscores the need for a savings program.
This results from the widely recognized fact that home
ownership is the best traditional form of Favings.
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Although VA loans allow veterans to purchase without the
customary downpayments, homeownership and the savings that
it would allow are not necessarily attractive for military
personnel. A special insert by the Wall Street Journal on
real estate describes the short term housing owners'
dilemma.
... selling and buying a home mean(s) steep transactions
costs--broker fees, loan points, and so on--that amount
to nearly 10% of the value. So the newly bought home
has to appreciate by more than 10% just to break even.
"Given the huge transaction costs, buying doesn't make
sense unless the holding period is going to be relative-
ly long."[Ref. 37]
Required moving every two to three years does not always
allow time for a single residence to appreciate enough to
overcome high transaction costs. As a result, military
members are forced to sell before appreciation can offset
the transaction costs incurred in buying and selling; or,
they become reluctant landlords. Becoming a reluctant land-
lord presumably results in savings programs receiving less
attention.
Frequent moves discourage savings in another way. Most
military families enjoy moving to different locations and
meeting people. However, moving can disrupt a working
spouse's opportunity for upward mobility in a given career
by losing the longevity, seniority and credentials from one
state to another. This translates into lost income which
can provide the basis for saving.
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E. CURRENT ALTERNATIVES
Despite the relative inexperience, youth, mobility and
low pay of service members, which indicate a lower savings
rate, members of the military have some savings options.
Service members have excellent job security and some of
their income from allowances (e.g., housing and subsistance)
provide an imputed tax advantage. Almost all of the
military members are income eligible to contribute to an
Individual Retirement Account (IRA) in that their Adjusted
Gross Income (AGI) is below the limits set for the full
deductible contribution. However, national figures on IRA
contributions remain low. "A May 1988 census survey found
that 12 percent of workers age 16 and older were contribu-
ting to IRAs. Of those not covered by employer plans, only
10 percent contributed to IRAs."[Ref. 29:p. 3) This com-
pares with the employer-sponsored THRIFT savings plan, which
has 54.4 percent of its FERS participants contributing, only
three years since its introduction.(See Appendix B.)
Why has participation in the IRA approach been so low?
Perhaps many do not understand that if they are to have any
capital at all when they are 59 (the age eligible to
withdraw funds), they should be contributing to an account
in the least costly manner. Military members, focusing on
the 20 to 30 year retirement goal, may consider their
intermediate goals more important. Two major responsi-
bilities may present quite formidable intermediate saving
goals, namely, buying a home and paying for college
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education. (See Table 5.1) Civilian counterparts can
utilize sweetened employer-sponsored equity borrowing
options from their retirement plans or home equity loans.
Service members do not have an employer-sponsored
savings plan. Many service members do not own homes and
live in government provided quarters.
F. RETIREMENT AND TRANSITION TO CIVILIAN LIFE
Service members will undoubtedly experience a more
difficult psychological transition to a civilian job when
faced with the capital-intensive responsibilities of
college tuition and home ownership. Without proper planning
and a disciplined approach to savings, career service
members may be facing escalating tuition costs at the same
time as they are dropping down to a retirement stipend.
Military "retirement" should be thought of as a transition
to civilian life.
20-year retirees will receive half of their base pay, or
approximately 37 percent of their total pay. Allowances
for quarters, subsistence or other pay are not included
in base pay.[Ref. 38]
Financial planners traditionally suggest you will need
60 to 80 percent of pre-retirement income after you re-
tire to live comfortably and to meet expenses.
[Ref. 38:p. 7]
Therefore, even families with retirement pay must seek add-
itional income, since they need 60-80 percent not 37 percent
cf pre-retirement income. The prospects are particularly
alarming for those who have been consuming all disposable
income, raising children and living in government housing
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TABLE 5.1 COLLEGE SAVINGS CALCULATOR
How much parents need to put asioe each month to meet the




begins college Public Private Public Private
1 $27,923 $59,200 $2,228 $4,724
2 29,877 63,344 1,144 2,426
3 31,969 67,778 783 1,661
4 34,207 72,522 603 1,278
5 36,601 77,599 495 1,049
6 39,163 83,031 423 896
7 41,904 88,843 371 787
8 44,838 95,062 333 705
9 47,976 101,716 303 642
10 51,335 108,837 279 591
11 54,928 116,455 259 549
12 58,773 124,607 243 515
13 62,887 133,329 229 485
14 67,289 142,663 217 460
15 72,000 152,649 207 438
16 77,040 163,334 198 4]9
17 82,432 174,768 190 402
18 88,203 187,002 183 387
*Four-year costs include tuition, fees, room and board,
books and transportation. Table assumes 7% annual increases
of college costs and 8% annual pre-tax return on
investments, and College Board Annual Survey of Colleges,
1989. Table assumes no additional investments, and no
additional earnings on balance invested, once child starts
school.
Source: T. Rowe Price Associates [Ref. 39]
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during their military careers. This group must be
especially prudent about saving. They will have even
greater expenses on significantly lower income.
G. SUMMARY
In summary, the evidence suggests the active duty
military member has the same reasons to save for future
expenses as civilians but does not have the same means.
Their expenses are likely to be great. In addition, because
of their relatively young age, low income and the frequency
of directed moves, they are not likely to be following the
necessary principles espoused by good financial management.
In fact, the military member's advantages of an early
retirement, easy home loans through the VA and job security
may actually reduce their incentive to establish a contin-
gency saving program.
The evidence is clear that there is a need for active
duty personnel to have an emplo\e -o',nsored saving program




AN ACCOUNT FOR SAVING ACTIVE PAY
This chapter will introduce a tax-sheltered savings
program for active duty military personnel. This proposal
is called an Account for Saving Active Pay (ASAP). It is
intended to give military personnel an employer-sponsored
retirement saving program similar to plans currently
available to civilians. ASAP is designed after the 403(b)
or tax-sheltered annuity (TSA). The TSA retirement plan,
specified by section 403(b) of the IRS code, is allowed for
nonprofit organizations and public school employees. The
ASAP proposal envisions extending the eligibility to active
duty military personnel. It builds on the existing TSA or
403(b) by using the same limits and by tailoring the program
to the military compensation system. The purpose of the
ASAP proposal is to help generate an increase in personal
savings in the military (without merely shifting savings
from one sector to another) thus affecting the low national
savings rate in a positive way.
A. EXTENDING ELIGIBILITY OF TSA OR TSP
The review of employer-sponsored retirement savings
programs in Chapter IV revealed two plans for possible
consideration, the Thrift Savings Plan for government
employees and the TSA or 403(b) for nonprofit organizations.
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A case could be made in each instance that military service
members are government employees and are also working for a
nonprofit organization. In each case, extending the benefit
of these plans to include military personnel was determined
to be reasonable considering the following rationale.
The IRS currently allows two types of organizations to
offer TSAs or 403(b) plans:
* public school systems
* 501(c)(3) organizations--which are nonprofit
organizations like nonprofit hospitals and nonprofit
charitable, educational, scientific or religious
groups.[Ref. 34]
The military most closely parallels nonprofit educational or
charitable organizations. IRS publication 557, entitled
"Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization," describes
an educational organization as follows:
The term educational relates to the instruction or
training of individuals for the purpose of improving or
developing their capabilities, ...[being] beneficial to
the community.[Ref. 40]
The Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and the Coast Guard
all perform as educational organizations and perform a
function beneficial to the community--common defense. The
IRS further describes charitable organizations in a similar
way:
If your organization is applying for recognition of
exemption as a charitable organization, it must show
that it is organized and operated for purposes that are
beneficial for the public interest. Some examples of
this type of organization are those which are organized
for:
* ...advancement of education or science;
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* Erection or maintenance of public buildings;
monuments or works;
* Lessening the burdens of government;
* ... elimination of prejudice and discrimination;
* Defense of human and civil rights secured
by law; and,
* Combating community deterioration and
juvenile delinquency.[Ref. 40:p. 13]
Logically, the uniformed services are organized and operated
for purposes which are beneficial to the public interest in
that they are chartered by Congress to support and defend
the U.S. Constitution. Examples of how the military meets
these criteria include: fighting the "war against drugs,"
maintaining ships, aircraft and equipment, defending human
and civil rights as well as national interests in operations
such as "Desert Shield" in Saudi Arabia, Operation
"Just Cause" in Panama or the Freedom of Navigation
operations near Libya.
The rationale for extending the government's employer-
sponsored (TSP) plan to the military is straightforward.
The military and the government employees share the same
employer.
B. RATIONALE FOR THE TSA
The ASAP proposal was designed after the 403(b) for two
reasons. First, the 403(b) plan does not require the
employer to contribute any income. Therefore, the cost to
the government is limited to only the delay in payment of
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taxes. It successfully makes the voluntary decision to save
or to consume a neutral one.
The second reason is that the 403(b) plan's limits on
contributions are more appropriate to the military pay
scale. The military retirement system is based on basic pay.
This is the only cash pay received by all the military
members each month. It is based on pay grade and time in
service. Members of the services are eligible to retire
with a minimum of 20 years of cumulative service. Taking
this into consideration, it is reasonable to base the
savings account contributions on the basic pay as well.
Table 6.1 displays the 1990 Basic Pay Scale for
Officers. The table is in terms of monthly basic pay for
officer pay grades. The 20 percent or $9500 annual limit of
the 403(b) means a maximum contribution would be reached by
a participant making an annual salary of $47,500. It is
mathematically determined as follows:
100% x
TSA limit 20% = $9500; therefore, 5 x $9500 = $47,500.
$47,500 (annual salary)
12 (months) = $3958.33 per month.
Referring to Table 6.1, an 0-5 (a Navy Commander or an
Army Lieutenant Colonel for example) with over 20 cumula-
tive years of service is payed $3983.40 in Basic Pay per
month, or $47,800.80 basic pay per year. This makes for an
almost perfect match with the salary cap of the TSA plan.
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TABLE 6.1 THE 1990 BASIC PAY SCALE FOR OFFICERS
(in dollars per month)
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The higher 20 percent of salary limit with 403(b), as op-
posed to the 10 percent limit of the TSP, makes this
possible.
Figuring the comparable maximum contribution possible
with the TSP limits illustrates that the limits are not
practical for the pay scale.
100% x
TSP limit 10% = $7979; therefore, $7979 x 10 = $79,790.
$79790 (annual salary)
12 (months) = $6649.17 per month.
This demonstrates that in order to maximize the contribu-
tion, an annual salary of $79,790 or a monthly salary of
$6649.17 is required. Referring to Table 6.1, the basic
pay of the highest ranking military member (the 0-10s) is
capped at $6516.60 per month. Thus, even the highest paid
military member is not able to contribute the maximum amount
with the TSP limits. This shows that the 403(b)'s limits of
20 percent of salary or $9500 are more realistic for the
military pay scale.
C. TSA MODIFICATION
The most significant modification of the TSA program
incorporated by ASAP is prorating the 20 percent deduction
of salary. The ASAP proposal would permit contributions of
one percent of base pay per year of cumulative military ser-
vice (up to the 20 percent TSA maximum). The purpose of
an increasing benefit with time in service is to provide
an incentive for longevity in the service. It is also
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consistent with the implied principles of the military
compensation system.
The GAO has developed a list of principles which
military compensation should provide. The following
principles apply:
* have a predictable adjustment mechanism;
* distinguish between levels of responsibility;
* support and preserve the hierarchical military
structure;
* be fully visible to service members and the public;
* minimize pay differentials among people of equal
rank and service time.[Ref. 24:p. 25]
Prorating the contributable limit for each year of service
would do all of the above.
Simply knowing that the entitlement increases one
percent for each year of service, creates a psychological
effect. The service member can translate the increase into
an increase in pay privileges. Since the program is volun-
tary, the member may not even participate yet still feel
rewarded with the opportunity to contribute at a higher
level. The one percent increase per year conforms to the
principle of a predictable adjustment mechanism.
Distinguishing between levels of responsibility is
important in the services. Frequently a junior officer has
responsibility for enlisted personnel who have more time
in service. The pay scale recognizes this and rewards both
increases in grade and time in service. By gradually
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increasing the eligibility, the hierarchical structure is
emphasized.
Another reason for the increasing benefit involves
successful financial management; that is, the principle when
establishing a budget to "pay oneself first." Instead of
being intimidated by the 20 percent limit for a deduction,
personnel could grow into the budget change. Each year a
small adjustment of one percent could be added to their
previous deduction. It is much easier to rationalize a
change in spending behavior at one percent than to
dramatically alter one's lifestyle. A successful savings
plan must provide an incentive for people to realistically
address and alter their spending behavior.
For some people, imposing self-discipline achieves long-
term results. In an article on mandatory retirement saving,
the authors describe an interesting phenomenon:
Mandatory retirement saving is in a sense a collective
manifestation of the 'Christmas Club' syndrome. The
phenomenon is that individuals deliberately discipline
themselves to save for a future goal, whether Christmas
shopping or retirement, by making it costly or
impossible to stop doing so. Other examples are the
use of mortgage or installment credit to make purchases
which some consumers could finance in whole nr part by
drawing on liquid assets. The rationale is that they
fear they will not in fact restore their assets, while
the debt repayment contract forces them to do the equiv-
alent saving. In these cases the household seeks to
protect its true long-run utility maximization against
less valid short-run temptations, self-disciplinary be-
haviour that is not less real for being ruled out of
standard economic models.[Ref. 41]
The lesson for the ASAP program's prorated limits is to
demonstrate to the contributor that sticking to a realistic
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one percent increase can produce the desired goal. In
this way, the contributor can "force" himself to stick to
the plan. After all, it's the follow-through with a program
that is important.
D. MAXIMUM POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Examples of maximum potential contributions which could
serve as "carrots" for participation have been calculated
using the 1990 pay scale. An officer is assumed to
contribute the maximum amount allowable until reaching 20
percent of base pay at 20 years of service. Table 6.2 indi-
ates the time in each grade for a typical officer's career.
TABLE 6.2 TIME IN GRADE FOR AN OFFICER
Grade / Rank Time in Service
0-1 commissioning
up to 2 years
0-2 2 to 4 years
0-3 4 to 10 years
0-4 10 to 16 years
0-5 16 to 20 years
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.
Note: Time in Service includes all services, rounded to the
nearest year.
Based on the time in service and the monthly base pay,
the maximum amount an officer could contribute for each year
of service is illustrated in Table 6.3. Using the tables
for the future value of a dollar (see Appendix C), with an
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TABLE 6.3 MAXIMUM ASAP CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR OFFICERS IN 1990 DOLLARS
Years of Monthly Annual Contributions
Service Rank Base Pay Base Pay % Annual Monthly
1 0-1 $1,387.20 $16,646.40 1 $166.46 $13.87
2 0-1 1,387.20 16,646.40 2 332.93 27.74
3 0-2 1,745.10 20,941.20 3 628.24 52.35
4 0-2 2,096.40 25,156.80 4 1,006.27 83.86
5 0-3 2,423.40 29,092.80 5 1,454.64 121.22
6 0-3 2,423.40 29,092.80 6 1,745.57 145.46
7 0-3 2,539.20 30,470.40 7 2,132.93 177.74
8 0-3 2,539.20 30,470.40 8 2,437.63 203.14
9 0-3 2,630.40 31,564.80 9 2,840.83 236.74
10 0-3 2,630.40 31,564.80 10 3,156.48 263.04
11 0-4 2,909.70 34,916.40 11 3,840.80 320.07
12 0-4 2,909.70 34,916.40 12 4,189.97 349.16
13 0-4 3,073.20 36,878.40 13 4,794.19 399.52
14 0-4 3,073.20 36,878.40 14 5,162.98 430.25
15 0-4 3,213.60 38,563.20 15 5,784.48 482.04
16 0-4 3,213.60 38,563.20 16 6,170.11 514.18
17 0-5 3,656.70 43,880.40 17 7,459.67 621.64
18 0-5 3,656.70 43,880.40 18 7,898.47 658.21
19 0-5 3,866.40 46,396.80 19 8,815.39 734.62
20 0-5 3,866.40 46,396.80 20 9,279.36 773.28
21 0-5 3,983.40 47,800.80 20 9,500.00* 791.67
* The maximum annual contribution to an ASAP account is 20
percent or $9,500.00.
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assumed 8 percent interest rate on the investment, an
officer's potential maximum account balance after 20 years
of service of $139,565.79 (shown in Table 6.4).
Taxes would be due upon withdrawal of this account, or
the account could be partially or fully rolled-over into an
IRA. If the lump sum option were taken, assuming a tax
bracket of 28 percent, the account would net $100,487.37.
This would provide a sizable addition to an officer's
retirement benefit, yet would not be unreasonably large or
unattainable. Since the officer is presumed to be transi-
tioning into a civilian job and not immediately retiring,
this would be a reasonable quantity, in today's purchasing
power to meet the responsibilities of buying a home or
paying tuitions (see Table 5.1).
The matured account would supplement an 0-5's monthly
retirement pay (see Table 6.1). The retirement stipend is
calculated at 50% of the officer's monthly basic pay
(e.g., $3866.40 x .5 = $1933.20 per month before taxes).
For those who entered service after the 1986 Reform, the
factor for monthly pay drops to 40%. When a service member
reaches the maximum 20 percent contribution, or the $9500
limit, additional years in the service beyond twenty remain
an incentive to contribute up to the maximum level. This
rewards longevity while preserving the principles of
military compensation.
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TABLE 6.4 MAXIMUM ASAP BALANCE
FOR OFFICERS IN 1990 DOLLARS
Future Value of
Years of Annual $1 factor at Total Value
Service Contributions 8%, n periods After 20 yrs
1 $ 199.46 x 4.6610 = $ 929.68
2 332.93 4.3157 1,436.83
3 628.24 3.9960 2,510.45
4 1,006.27 3.7000 3,723.20
5 1,454.64 3.4259 4,983.45
6 1,745.57 3.1722 5,537.30
7 2,132.93 2.9372 6,264.84
8 2,437.63 2.7196 6,629.38
9 2,840.83 2.5182 7,153.78
10 3,156.48 2.3316 7,359.65
11 3,840.80 2.1589 8,291.90
12 4,189.97 1.9990 8,375.75
13 4,794.19 1.8509 8,873.57
14 5,162.98 1.7138 8,848.32
15 5,784.48 1.5869 9,179.39
16 6,170.11 1.4693 9,065.74
17 7,459.67 1.3605 10,148.88
18 7,898.47 1.2597 9,949.70
19 8,815.39 1.1664 10,282.27
20 9,279.36 1.0800 10,021.71
Totals: $79,297.40 of contributions yields: $139,565.79
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The same methodology was employed to calculate the
enlisted member's hypothetical maximum account balance.
Table 6.5 indicates the rime in service for each grade for
a typical enlisted member's career.
Table 6.5 TIME IN GRADE FOR AN ENLISTED MEMB2R
Grade/ rank Years of Service
E-1 enlistment to
6 months








Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.
Based on the time in service and the monthly base pay,
shown in Table 6.6, the maximum amount an enlisted member
could contribute for each year of service is illustrated in
Table 6.7. Using the tables for the future value of a
dollar (see Appendix C), with an assumed 8 percent interest
rate on the investment, an enlisted member's potential
maximum account balance after 20 years of service oE
$71,584.60 (shown in Table 6.8).
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TABLE 6.6 THE 1990 BASIC PAY SCALE FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL
(in dollars per month)
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TABLE 6.7 MAXIMUM ASAP CONTRIBUTIONS
FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN 1990 DOLLARS
Years of Monthly Annual Contributions
Service Rank Base Pay Base Pay % Annual Monthly
1 E-1/E-2 $798.50 $9,582.00* 1 $ 95.82 7.99
2 E-3 843.60 10,123.20 2 202.46 16.87
3 E-4 945.60 11,347.20 3 340.42 28.37
4 E-4 1,001.10 12,013.20 4 480.53 40.04
5 E-4 1,078.80 12,945.60 5 647.28 53.94
6 E-5 1,143.30 13,719.60 6 823.18 68.60
7 E-5 1,218.00 14,619.60 7 1,023.37 85.28
8 E-5 1,218.00 14,619.60 8 1,169.57 97.46
9 E-5 1,268.10 15,217.20 9 1,369.55 114.13
10 E-6 1,391.70 16,700.40 10 1,670.04 139.17
11 E-6 1,443.00 17,316.00 11 1,904.76 158.73
12 E-6 1,443.00 17,316.00 12 2,077.92 173. 6
13 E-6 1,517.40 18,208.80 13 2,367.14 197.26
14 E-7 1,672.80 20,073.60 14 2,810.30 234.19
15 E-7 1,748.70 20,984.40 15 3,147.66 262.31
16 E-7 1,748.70 20,984.40 16 3,357.50 279.79
17 E-7 1,798.20 21,578.40 17 3,668.33 305.69
18 E-8 2,024.70 24,296.40 18 4,373.35 364.45
19 E-8 2,071.20 24,854.40 19 4,722.34 393.53
20 E-8 2,071.20 24,854.40 20 4,970.88 414.24
21 E-9 2,421.00 29,052.00 20 5,810.40 484.20
* To calculate the first year of base pay, a weighted
average was used. 4 mos. @ E-1 x $724.20 = $2,896.80
2 mos. @ E-1 x 811.80 = 1,623.60
6 mos. @ E-2 x 843.60 = 5,061.60
total base pay for the first year = $9,582.00
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TABLE 6.8 MAXIMUM ASAP BALANCE
FOR ENLISTED PERSONNEL IN 1990 DOLLARS
Future Value of
Years of Annual $1 factor at Total Value
Service Contributions 8%, n periods After 20 yrs
1 $ 95.72 x 4.6610 = $ 446.15
2 202.46 4.3157 873.76
3 340.42 3.9960 1,360.32
4 480.53 3.7000 1,777.96
5 647.28 3.4259 2,217.52
6 823.18 3.1722 2,611.29
7 1,023.37 2.9372 3,005.84
8 1,169.57 2.7196 3,180.76
9 1,369.55 2.5182 3,448.80
10 1,670.04 2.3316 3,893.87
11 1,904.76 2.1589 4,112.19
12 2,077.92 1.9990 4,153.76
13 2,367.14 1.8509 4,381.34
14 2,810.30 1.7138 4,816.29
15 3,147.66 1.5869 4,995.02
16 3,357.50 1.4693 4,933.17
17 3,668.33 1.3605 4,990.76
18 4,373.35 1.2597 5,509.11
19 4,722.34 1.1664 5,508.14
20 4,970.88 1.0800 5,368.55
Totals: $41,222.40 of contributions yields:$71,584.60.
76
If the lump sum option were taken, assuming a tax
bracket of 28 percent, the account would net $51,540.91. If
portions of the account were withdrawn, the more likely tax
bracket would be 15 percent which would net $60,846.91.
E. THE ANACRONYM ASAP
The anacronym ASAP was deliberately chosen because of
its familiarity in the military. It is one of the first
learned and most widely used anacronyms in the service,
meaning "As Soon As Possible." It is envisioned that, like
the government's "Thrift" Savings Plan, which conjures up
the positive virtue of "thrift" espoused by Benjamin
Franklin, military personnel will feel more comfortable
with such a term, overcoming the natural resistance to
change. Imaginative publicity utilizing the anacronym's
double meaning might thus increase participation. It should
be emphasized that the service member should begin this
voluntary program "as soon as possible" to boost his or her
retirement potential.
F. ELIGIBILITY
Eligibility requirements of the ASAP proposal were
determined to be active duty personnel for several reasons.
Reservists have other civilian jobs and are presumably
already eligible for employer-sponsored retirement programs.
They are not directed to move as frequently nor are they
subject to a pay gap inequity in their civilian employment.
The United States is the only country which offers
77
retirement benefits to part-time military reservists
[Ref. 42). ASAP would specifically not include reserve per-
sonnel in order to preserve ASAP as a relative benefit of
remaining in the active forces. Employer-sponsored savings
plans terminate when there is a change of status with the
employer. Any eligible active duty member can therefore
participate in the ASAP program as long as he or she re-
ceives an active duty paycheck. Reservists work in an
active duty status two days a month and an additional two
weeks a year. Since this is a long-term savings program,
participation by reserve personnel is considered
inappropriate.
G. PROFESSIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE ACCOUNT
An important consideration of the employer-sponsored
savings programs is professional management of the assets.
The government recognized this when incorporating the TSP
plan. For example:
All of the money in the TSP is invested and managed by
the Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board, a newly
created, independent government agency.[Ref. 33:p.15]
The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board is
responsible for operating the plan in the interests of the
participants and for maintaining the financial statements.
This board is composed of "five members appointed by the
President to oversee the TSP. Of the five members, one is
recommended by the Senate and one by the House of Represent-
atives."[Ref. 33:p. 68] This agency's professional
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management could be extended to include operation of the
ASAP program. The Board bids the TSP account out to capable
investment management service companies. The current TSP
stock and bond funds have been contracted for with Wells
Fargo Bank.
Many financial management companies offer TSA accounts
and could also be considered contenders for the ASAP
account. They include, but are not limited to:
Citicorp, Fidelity Investments, Prudential and the USAA
Annuity and Life Insurance Company. These financial
institutions feature TSAs with options from secure to
aggressive investments, interfund transfers and low interest
loan arrangements.
H. IMPLEMENTATION
IRS publication number 571 explains how Social Security
benefits are not disrupted by TSA contributions. "The con-
tributions toward the tax sheltered annuity under a salary
reduction agreement are considered wages for the FICA
(Social Security) tax."[Ref. 31:p. 9] Therefore, Social
Security tax and benefits are not affected by nor need to be
adjusted by salary reduction. This simplifies the
accounting and keeps all personnel eligible for identical
Social Security benefits whether they contribute or not.
Every month, service members receive a Leave and
Earnings Statement (LES) which shows entitlements,
deductions and allotments as well as occasionally passing
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along administrative information. The LES is an important
statement for service members because it reinforces progress
in the service member's accruing entitlements. Proposed
changes for incorporating ASAP with the LES would include:
* indicating the amount of elected percent contributions
in the "Remarks" section of the LES.
* recording the reduction in Federal Tax as a credit in
the Earnings section. This would increase the service
member's Total Earnings.
* indicating the ASAP contribution as an allotment in
the Deductions section on the right hand side of the
LES.
The maximum allowable percent would be determined by the
years (YRS) box on the top line of the LES following the
Name, Social Security Number (SSN) and Pay Grade. The YRS
box is determined by each individual's Pay Entry Base Date.
Figure 6.1 is an example of an E-5's monthly LES.
The eligibility to increase the percent of contributions
would be evenly dispersed throughout the year, because each
individual's Pay Entry Base Date is also evenly distributed.
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I. SUMMARY OF ASAP
The purpose of ASAP is to extend the eligibility of an
employer-sponsored savings plan to active duty military
personnel. Features of the ASAP proposal include:
* Tax savings with direct deposit
(federal taxes are not deducted from the paycheck
until after the contributions.);
* Tax-deferred investment earnings;
* Graduated eligibility rising at a rate of one percent
for each year of cumulative service;
* Professional management:
- choice of investments from secure to aggressive
- interfund transfer; and,
- favorable interest loan program
* Portability when leaving the service;
* Contribution limits capping at $9500 or 20 percent of
salary (basic pay in the military);
* No effect on Social Security for tax purposes; and,
* High visibility on Leave and Earnings Statements.
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VII. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF THE ASAP PROGRAM
Determining the costs and benefits of any proposal is
difficult, particularly when the rate of participation must
be estimated. The cost of the ASAP program to the govern-
ment is primarily the amount of the tax revenue that is
deferred. That amount depends on estimates of the number of
participants, the amount they elect to defer and their
relative tax bracket.
A. COSTS
The management fees associated with implementation are
absorbed by the participants as part of their investment
contributions. This results in no cost to the government.
The manpower costs of implementation are "sunk costs" in
that they have already been established in the accounting
system. The reasoning here is that the resources are
available to make adjustments to the military members' pay
and allowances and the marginal costs of introducing ASAP
are negligible.
The following estimates are used to determine the tax
revenue that would be deferred as a result of implementing
the ASAP program. Total basic pay for active duty military
for calendar year 1989, according to the Defense Manpower
Data Center, was approximately $35.4 billion. The partici-
pation rate is estimated to be approximately 50 percent
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based on the current participation rate of the government's
employer-sponsored saving plan (THRIFT savings plan). This
is an optimistic assumption so as not to underestimate the
expense of implementation.
The next estimate is to determine the average percent
distribution of contributions. Since the ASAP proposal
allows a graduated increase corresponding to years of
service, the total must be between one and 20 percent. The
average time in service is 6.6 years for officers and 4.8
years for enlisted personnel (see Appendix D).
Since there is about a six to one ratio of enlisted
personnel to officers (1,767,194:288,735) this yields a
weighted average maximum level of contribution of 5.1 years.
(See Appendix E.) This translates to a six percent partici-
pation, since the participant would be into the sixth year
of service.
The next estimated figure is determining the marginal
tax bracket of the contributors. Based on calendar year
1989 taxable wages, the majority of military personnel were
in the 15 percent tax bracket (see Table 7.1).
In Table 7.1, the number of members in for a full year
were multiplied by their corresponding tax brackets (i.e.,
15, 28 and 33). The respective products were added and then
divided by three to obtain the weighted average tax bracket.
This yielded the weighted average marginal tax bracket of
16 percent for all members in for a full year.
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TABLE 7.1 MARGINAL TAX BRACKETS OF MILITARY
BASED ON CALENDAR YEAR 1989 TAXABLE WAGES
All members Members in for full year
number % number %
15% 2,016,064 91.9 1,766,703 90.9
28% 175,282 8.0 175,263 9.0
33% 2,591 .1 2,591 .1
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.
The following calculations are made to determine an est-
imate of the deferred tax revenue involved in implementing
ASAP.
Total basic pay in calendar year 1989: $35.4 billion
multiplied by estimated participation: x .5
Total basic pay of participants: $17.7 billion
multiplied by average % distribution
or contributions (6%): x .06
(Estimated total contributions): $1.062 billion
multiplied by marginal weighted
average tax bracket of contributors: x .16
(Estimated deferred tax revenue): $169.9 million
Thus, a conservative estimate of the approximate cost
of buying in to the ASAP proposal is $170 million.
Adopting the ASAP proposal is cost-effective if $170 million
in benefits can be generated to compensate for the deferred
tax revenue. To illustrate the relative magnitude of $170
million, we can relate this amount to total basic pay ($35.4
billion) for 1990. The result shows that $170 million is
less than a 0.5 percent pay increase to the military.
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Another way to consider the cost in is in terms of the
lost revenue and its impact on the deficit. Total FY 1990
revenues (individual income taxes, corporate taxes, social
taxes and excise taxes) amounted to $1.1 trillion.[Ref. 43]
This proposal would appear to diminish total revenues by:
$170 million
$1.1 trillion which equals .01545 percent.
When analyzing the lost revenue in terms of its impact on
the deficit, we see that it is even smaller than an order of
magnitude less than a tenth of one percent. It results in
a very minor fiscal adjustment. And note that since this
revenue is deferred, it is ultimately paid to the govern-
ment, though there may be a small loss in revenue if the
participants are in a lower tax bracket when they withdraw
the funds.
B. BENEFITS
This thesis emphasizes the equity issue involved in
employer-sponsored saving plans. Employee groups in the
private sector, from profit to nonprofit organizations as
well as government employees, are eligible for these plans.
If the government plans to rectify the inequality of exclu-
ding military personnel from such plans, then the least
costly program would be preferred.
Unlike the TSP, the ASAP proposal does not require any
employer contributions. Additionally, the maximum eligibil-
ity to contribute is phased in, which decreases the overall
cost. Furthermore, the ASAP proposal includes only full
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time active duty military personnel, as opposed to one
including reservists.
1. Generating Additional Savings
One benefit of implementing a tax-sheltered program
for active duty military personnel is generating additional
savings for the loanable funds market. Referring back tc
the calculations that estimated tne deferred tax revenue,
the estimated total contributions for a given level of par-
ticipation can be determined. At a level of 50 percent
participation, which results in a cost of approximately $170
million, the additional savings amounts to over $1 billion.
A significant aspect of this input of funds is that there
would be minimal transfer of funds from existing savings
accounts. Because the money is directly contributed from
salaries, transferring existing savings into the account is
prevented. Furthermore, because the contributions are de-
ducted before taxes, it is unlikely that personal savings in
other accounts would be reduced by the total amount contri-
buted to ASAP. This potential $1 billion injected into the
loanable funds market will help the economy to expand.
Businesses will circulate the money back into the personal
sector through wages and revenue will flow back to the
government in the form of taxes on capital gains. Thus,
this additional source of long-term savings will be
invested in wealth-generating corporations or government
securities, providing real benefits to all participants.
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2. Retaining Experienced Personnel
An important challenge for the Department of Defense
in the 1990's is to improve the management of parsonnel
during a period of declining force levels. The goal of re-
ducing the force level should not include unnecessary losses
of experienced personnel. This leads to a hollow force.
The ASAP proposal offers, in effect, a pay raise to only the
personnel who opt to participate. It effectively targets
active duty personnel, specifically providing increased
benefits to those who wish to make the service a career.
The cumulative rewards are increased for those experienced
personnel who are difficult and costly to replace. The ca-
pability to retain experienced personnel comes from the
increased benefits which ASAP makes available to people who
stay in the services for the long haul. The significance tc
the government is that the pay scale is not altered. This
does not affect retirement outlays which are determined by
using the basic pay scale.
3. Elimination of Double Taxation
ASAP represents one way to reduce the effect of
double taxation of saving and reduces the bias against
saving. This restores the neutrality between saving and
spending. Taxes would be due upon withdrawal from the
account. By deferring the tax, ASAP reduces the incentive
for immediate consumption since the amount saved is not
penalized by a tax that reduces its buying power.
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4. En-ouraging Military Savings
ASAP encourages military members to establish a
methodical savings vehicle. It can be dovetailed into
personal financial management programs designed to educate
military personnel about the value of investing. ASAP
provides a means for military personnel to save for inter-
mediate savings. It is interesting to note that the GAO
calculated that defaults on student loans increased from $50
million in 1988 to $247 million in 1989.[Ref. 441 If the
financial resources had been saved in advance, the loan
default rate may have been mitigated. ASAP could help pro-
vide the financial resources for the education of military
dependents. The same would be true with home loans--
avoiding possible default situations.
5. Deferring Taxes
It has already been mentioned that the structure of
the ASAP program is designed to defer taxable contributions
and their earnings in the account. This is not only a bene-
fit for the participants but it also benefits the govern-
ment. As the account grows, so too does the potential
revenue the government will collect in the form of taxes
which will be due upon withdrawal. ASAP is thus just as
much an investment for the government as it is for the




Our low national savings adversely affects our economic
growth. The conclusion of this research is that the decline
in the savings rate and its implications are significant and
that governmental action is needed to reverse this
condition. It suggests the need to establish incentives,
through a carefully designed tax structure, to promote
savings that will provide us with the catalyst for competi-
tiveness which we need. Our present income tax system
favors consumption over saving. Moving toward a consumption
or expenditure tax philosophy would restore neutrality
toward spending and would almost certainly improve savings
in the near term.
The low national savings rate affects all citizens, but
it is particularly costly to the military. Members of
Congress realize that low national savings is a problem anm
direct the pressure to reduce spending toward discretionary
spending programs. This has resulted in a continuing trend
of approving pay increases for the military that are less
inflation and an erosion of retirement benefits for military
personnel. The uncertainty of congressional support and the
loss of commitment to maintain competitiveness with the pri-
vate sector may result in a serious loss of career military
personnel within the next several years.
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The evidence suggests the active duty military member
has the same reasons to save for future expenses as
civilians, but does not have the same means. Because of
their relatively young age, low income and the frequency of
directed moves, members of the military are not likely to
follow the necessary principles espoused by good financial
management. The military member's advantages of an early
retirement, easy home loans through the VA and job security
may actually work against them in establishing a
contingency saving program.
Legislators have recognized the need for increased
savings and introduced profit-sharing and thrift savings
plans to civilians, but have not included the military. One
means of addressing the savings problem and this equity
issue foi. members of the military is a well-designed, tax-
protected saving plan. Such a plan would put military per-
sonnel on the same footing with similar groups of employees
in the U.S.
Of all the employer-sponsored plans offered to
civilians, the TSA or 403(b) is the most feasible plan to
tailor to the military pay scale. It is proposed that a
program, called an Account for Saving Active Pay (ASAP), be
established for these purposes. This proposal would permit
contributions of one percent of base pay per year of mili-
tary service (up to the 20 percent which TSA's allow), with
the account maturing upon termination of active duty.
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The government's cost of the ASAP program is primarily
the tax revenue that would be deferred. That amount depends
on estimates of the number of participants, the amount they
elect to defer and their relative tax bracket. The rate of
participatiun is difficult to determine. Using an optimis-
tic assumption, so as not to underestimate the expense of
implementation, the government's employer-sponsored savinc,
plan (THRIFT) current participation rate was utilized. This
resulted in an estimated deferred tax revenue which was
compared against the benefits.
It was determined that the ASAP proposal is cost-
effective because it appears that the benefits from the
additional savings generated, the retention of experienced
personnel, the restoration of neutrality between saving and
spending, the improvement of personal financial management
for military personnel and the growth of potential revenue
within the ASAP accounts together exceed the costs. It is
feasible and cost-effective to tailor the tax-sheltered
annuities (TSA's) currently available to nonprofit organiza-
tions and public school employees to the military
compensation system.
This program is intended to mesh the needs of active
duty military members, as part of an employee group, with
the need of the government to raise the net national savings
rate. ASAP is thus an investment for both the government




GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ANACRONYMS
AGI: Adjusted Gross Income
ASAP: Account for Saving Active Pay
CBO: Congressional Budget Office
CNO: Chief cf Naval Operations
COLA: Cost of Living Allowance
CPI: Consumer Price Index
CRS: Congressional Research Service
CSRS: Civil Service Retirement System
CY: Calendar Year
DMDC: Defense Manpower Data Center
DoD: Department of Defense
FERS: Federal Employees Retirement System
FoF: Flow of Funds
FSA: Family Savings Account
FY: Fiscal Year
GAO: General Accounting Office
GNP: Gross National Product
GRH: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
IRA: Individual Retirement Account
IRS: Internal Revenue Service
LES: Leave and Earnings Statement
NAVOP: Naval Operational Report
95
NIPA: National Income and Products Accounts
NJP: Non Judicial Punishrcnt
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development
OMB: Office of Management and Budget
OPNAVINST: Operational Navy Instruction
PFM: Personal Finance Management
R&D: Research and Development
TSA: Tax-Sheltered Annuity
TSP! Thrift Savings Plan




PARTICIPATION IN THE THRIFT SAVINGS PLAN (FERS EMPLOYEES)




for TSP to TSP to FERS
Executiv- Office of
the President 638 303 47.3
Executive Branch--
Departments
Agriculture 35,010 23,817 68.0
Commerce 9,533 5,165 54.2
Defense 38,641 22,919 59.3
Air Force 68,873 41,100 60.6
Army 105,407 55,528 52.7
Navy 95,692 48,261 50.4
Education 1,594 851 53.4
Energy 3,884 2,727 70.2
Health and Human
Services 24,708 13,260 53.7
Housing and
Urban Development 3,623 1,885 52.0
interior 16,854 10,019 59.4
Justice 31,625 17,540 55.5
Labor 4,175 2,208 52.9
State 5,353 3,948 73.8
Transportation 17,416 12,015 69.0
Treasur' 6 o ?72 32,288 49.4
Veterans Affairs 75,459 34,104 45.z
Subtotal 602,219 327,635 54.4
Executive Branch--
U.S. Postal
Service 270,077 141,182 52.3
Other Independent
Agencies 37,516 22,526 60.0
Judicial Branch 7,793 4,668 59.9
Legislative Branch 13,528 6,296 46.5
Other Entities 155 84 54.2
Total 931,926 502,964 53.9




FUTURE VALUE OF $1 AT THE END OF n PERIODS
FVIFkn = (1 + k) n
Period 6% 8% 10% 12%
1 1.0600 1.0800 1.1000 1.1200
2 1.1236 1.1664 1.2100 !.2544
3 1.1910 1.2597 1.3310 1.4049
4 1.2625 1.3605 1.4641 1.5735
5 1.3382 1.4693 1.6105 1.7623
6 1.4185 1.5869 1.7716 1.9738
7 1.5036 1.7138 1.9487 2.2107
8 1.5938 1.8509 2.1436 2.4760
9 1.6895 1.9990 2.3579 2.7731
1 1.7908 2.1589 2.5937 3.1058
11 1.8983 2.3316 2.8531 3.4785
12 2.0122 2.5182 3.1384 3.8960
13 2.1329 2.7196 3.4523 4 3635
14 2.2609 2.9372 3.7975 4.8871
15 2.3966 3.1722 4.1772 5.4736
16 2.5404 3.4259 4.5950 6.1304
17 2.6928 3.7000 5.0545 6.8660
18 2.8543 3.9960 5.5599 7.6900
19 3.0256 4.3157 6.1159 8.6128
20 3.2071 4.6610 6.7275 9.6463
21 3.3996 5.0338 7.4002 10.804
22 3.6035 5.4365 8.1403 12.100
23 3.8197 5.8715 8.9543 13.552
24 4.0489 6.3412 9.8497 15.179
25 4.2919 6.8485 10.835 17.000
26 4.5494 7.3964 11.918 19.040
27 4.8223 7.9881 13.110 21.325
28 5.1117 8.6271 14.421 23.884
29 5.4184 9.3173 15.863 26.750
30 5.7435 10.063 17.449 29.960




TIME IN SERVICE AT PROMOTION
ANALYSIS OF ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL






























TOTAL average time for enlisted is: 4.8 years of service.
Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, Monterey, California.
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APPENDIX E
ACTIVE DUTY PERSONNEL STATISTICS AS OF 30 JUNE 1990
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